Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Indeterminacy, philosophy: An object is indeterminate if its linguistic description indicates fewer characteristics than a member of a (linguistic) community usually needs to distinguish the object from other objects. See also uncertainty of translation, vagueness, under-determinateness, inscrutability, determinateness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Davidson on Indeterminacy - Dictionary of Arguments
I (b) 35/6 See here: Proposition: This "relativism" contains nothing that could show that the measured properties are not "real". I (b) 36 Strangely, however, these conclusions have been drawn by some: e.g. John Searle: it would be incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to correctly interpret the same thoughts or utterances of one person. I (b) 36 Just as numbers can capture all empirically significant relationships between weights or temperatures in an infinite number of different ways, a person's utterance can capture all the significant characteristics of the thoughts of another person in different ways. Jerry Fodor also argues that the holism or the indeterminacy of translation is a threat to realism regarding the propositinal attitudes. >Holism. - - - Glüer II 49 DavidsonVsFodor: the same mistake: indeterminacy of the translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal. The indeterminacy of the translation also applies when all data are available. (Quine). There is in principle more than one translation manual. >Translation manual. Indeterminacy of Interpretation/Davidson: There are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories. Davidson: Solution: we must cease to regard an utterance as belonging to a particular language and no other. Rather, we should identify languages with truth theories. The indeterminacy loses its scariness. - - - Davidson I 57 Relativity/Davidson: is not an indeterminateness at all. - - - Glüer II 46 Translating Indeterminacy/Quine/Davidson/Glüer: also exists when all data are available - there is in principle more than one translation manual. Glüer II 47 Indeterminacy of interpretation/Davidson: there are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories. Glüer II 47 Indeterminacy/Davidson/Glüer: there are 3 types: 1. The logical form: empirically equivalent theories (e.eq.th.) can identify predicates, singular terms etc. differently. 2. The reference: empirically equivalent theories can be assigned to different referents. 3. The truth: the same sentence can have different truth values for empirically equivalent theories. Glüer II 49 Problem: how can both sentences be appropriate? Solution: we must not regard an utterance as belonging to only one language. Instead: identify languages with truth theories._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Indeterminacy
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16