Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Unconscious: unconscious are processes in the inner life of subjects that are processed on no more than one level, i.e. influences such as perceptions or general stimuli, which are admitted into the subject but which are not reflected and thus do not provide a semantic content. If these influences are not lost, they represent a stock that can be reactivated and further processed. See also consciousness, self-consciousness, self, I, brain, mind, mental states, reflection, memory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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J.R. Searle on Unconscious - Dictionary of Arguments
I 192f Unconscious/Searle: according to the model of consciousness (pro, VsHeidegger) e.g. hammering is not done unconsciously but aware. There are two differences: conscious/unconscious, peripherals/center . Cf. >Awareness. I 160f SearleVsFreud: unconscious for him is like fish deep down in the sea (wrong idea of mental constance). They seem to have the same form. Problem: there is a false analogy: consciousness/perception (regress) requires yet another level of description, which does not exist, unconscious on the model of consciousness. >Regress. ((s) Cf. >Perception/Rorty). What is the ontology of the unconscious, as long as it is unconscious (revolt? hatred of the father?). If I take away the object (bicycle) from the perception, it is a hallucination, but that is what I cannot do in case of conscious thought, to obtain the unconscious._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Unconscious
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-24