Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Universals: Universals are expressions for what objects can have in common, such as a particular color. Examples of universals are redness, roundness, value. The ontological status of universals as something independent of thought - that is, their existence - is controversial. What is undisputed is that we form terms to generalize and use them successfully. See also General terms, Generality, Generalization, Ontology, Existence, Conceptual realism, Realism, Ideas, Methexis, Sortals, Conceptualism, Nominalism.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

David M. Armstrong on Universals - Dictionary of Arguments

III 82
Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now:
Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation
.
III 88
Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G).
1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation).
2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
III 99
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
III 118
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker.
III 120
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties).
Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.
- - -
Place II 57
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense.
MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.
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Martin I 77
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy.
Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102).
- - -
Martin II 129
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
- - -
Martin III 179
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

> Counter arguments against Armstrong
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