|Judgment: the use of the concept „judgment“ is not uniform. If the judgment is interpreted as the determination of the truth value ("true" or "false") of a statement, this is indicated explicitly, e.g. with the judgment stroke I- introduced by G. Frege. See also truth value, judgment stroke, sentence, statement, utterance, assertion._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Gareth Evans on Judgments - Dictionary of Arguments
McDowell I 73
Judgment/McDowellVsEvans: (...) the judgment does not introduce a new kind of content! It simply confirms the conceptual content that comes from experience!
Justification/McDowell: justification does not have to consist in one derivation step from one content to another. A typical perception judgment makes a selection, from a richer content provided by the experience.
McDowell I 74
Evans/McDowell: important: Evans says that experiences are states of the information system, but he does not say that the idea of experience is identical with the idea of the information system.
The states of the information system with its non-conceptual content (for example, of animals) are not ipso facto states of a conscious subject.
McDowell I 84
Judgment/Evans: Evans thinks that view and concept must be divided between experience and judgment. (McDowellVsEvans)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,