Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Judgments: A judgment differs from a statement in that it also asserts the truth of its content. In logic, this is expressed with a graphical emphasis, the judgment stroke. See also Truth, Statements, Assertions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Gottlob Frege on Judgments - Dictionary of Arguments
II 47 Judgement: the judgement is the progression from the thoughts to its truth value. >Thought, >Truth value. II 32 Judgement Line/Frege: the judgement line asserts something. On the other hand: "2 + 3 = 5" is just a truth value written down. With the judgement symbol/line it is said at the same time that the truth value is truth. >Judgment stroke. - - - IV 56 Judgment/Frege: e.g. if the accused was in Rome at the time, he could not have committed the crime. One judgement, three thoughts. IV 63 It is wrong to believe that a judgement realizes a connection or an order. >Order. IV 65 Judgement: is a mental process and needs a bearer. Negation/denial: negation does not need a bearer. >Negation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |