Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Junctions: Junctions in logic are a way of combining two or more logical expressions to produce a new logical expression. See also connectives, Logical constants, Logic, Logical formulas, Truth tables, Truth values._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Junctions - Dictionary of Arguments
II (b) 47 Junction/Armstrong: just as the state that the a"s are F contains the existence of a and F without being exhausted by the existence of the two constituents, the postulated junction of the universals implies the existence of regularity, without being exhausted by regularities. >Regularities, >Universals. - - - Martin II 126 Junction/Martin: Armstrong must introduce it as a fundamental undefined causal basic concept. Only in this way can he distinguish between random and non-random (causal) co-occurrences between universal-instantiations. Armstrong: not formal, more like a >meaning postulate. - No mysterious necessary junction between separate things. II 127 MartinVsArmstrong: we need connectivity instead of actual connection. II 128 Question: are connections between universals themselves 2nd-stage unversals? Martin II 128 Martin Example: MartinVsArmstrong: (example: distant particles*) - because of the possibility of constellations remote in time and space, he needs connectivity U = disp U instead of connection U as the basic concept Martin II 129 MartinVsArmstrong: Connections between U can still be necessary or contingent, no progress against Regth - Solution/Martin: "dispositionality" "in" things. - - - II (d) 149 Junction/MartinVsArmstrong: certainly connectivity, but not connection - ArmstrongVsMartin: between different things a and b there is not even something like connectivity - > II 176 * Martin: example: two non-occurring, equally likely events: no fact as truthmaker. - Same case: E.g. distant elementary particles that never react would behave idiosyncratically: there is no truth maker, no certain way, nevertheless: a counterfactual conditional applies: if they had come together, they would have reacted idiosyncratically..._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20