Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Vocabulary: A language’s vocabulary comprises all the words currently used by its speakers. The vocabulary is written down in dictionaries in comparison to grammar and syntax rules laid down in “rule books”. Vocabulary can be reduced to its use at a particular time or by individual speakers for the purpose of research. See also idiolect, language, private language, conservatism, words, meaning of a word, meaning. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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S.A. Kripke on Vocabulary - Dictionary of Arguments
III 335 Language/Davidson: Davidson’s criterion: a language may not have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: otherwise it cannot be the first language. >Language acquisition. III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: we only have to demand that only a finite number of axioms contain new vocabulary (weaker). III 338 Truth theory/Kripke: (here): condition i) the axioms define truth implicitly (i.e. we assume that the referential variables have intended domains and the substitutional variables have intended substitutional classes (which implicitly defines a quantity of truths of L.). Condition ii): a) the new axioms must have a true interpretation in the old vocabulary (with the intended interpretation)..., b) there is an equivalence schema for each closed sentence of the object language that only contains old vocabulary. Advantage: the ontology does not contain quantities of expressions of the meta language. Condition iia): is the requirement that there is a new interpretation of the predicates that contains the old ones. Condition iib): guarantees that T(x) contains a single extension (uniqueness). Tarski: Tarski only needs i) for its explicit truth definition (i.e. only old vocabulary). III 249 Condition (i) is satisfied (without presupposed truth concept) by (4) - (6) in the old vocabulary. III 347 Truth Theory/Davidson//Kripke: meta language may also contain semantic vocabulary! Translation is also guaranteed if both sides contain semantic vocabulary. Kripke: this is quite different in Tarski: truth and all semantic terms are explicitly defined in non-semantic vocabulary. >Truth theory, >Axioms/Kripke, >Meta language, >Object language. --- Frank I 32 Mental/physical/Kripke/Frank: the distinction mental/physical teaches the difference of the logical subjects of the physical and the mental. I attribute the physical to a naturalistic vocabulary (syntactic structures), the mental to a mentalist one (semantic structures). >Naturalism, >Mentalism, >Semantics, >Syntax._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Kripke
> Counter arguments in relation to Vocabulary
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20