## Phylosophy Dictionary of Arguments | |||

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Completeness, philosophy: A) Systems are complete, if all valid statements are provable. B) The question of the completeness of a description is always concerned with specific purposes of this description within the framework of a theory which applies to the described objects. It is a peculiarity in the case of particle physics that the complete description of elementary particles does not allow the differentiation of other particles of the same type. See also incompleteness, determinateness, determination, distinction, indistinguishability._____________ Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||

Author | Item | Summary | Meta data |
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X 80 Completeness Theorem/deductive/Quantifier Logic/Quine: (B) A scheme fulfilled by each model is provable. Theorem (B) can be proven for many proof methods. If we imagine such a method, then (II) follows from (B). (II) If a scheme is fulfilled by every model, then e is true for all insertions of propositions. X 83 Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the sentences, X 84 that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods produce true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define logical truth as the proposition produced by these proof procedures. 1. VsQuine: this usually triggers a protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of proof" is uninteresting in itself. It is only interesting because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with logical truth. 2. VsQuine: if one defines logical truth indirectly by reference to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its basis. It becomes empty. QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: the principle of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all! Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes logical truth interesting in the first place. X 100 Fake theory/quantities/classes/relation/Quine: is masked pure logic. Mathematics: begins when we accept the element relationship "ε" as a real predicate and accept classes as values of the quantified variables. Then we leave the realm of complete proof procedure. Logic: quantifier logic is complete. Mathematics: is incomplete. X 119 Intuitionism/Quine: gained buoyancy through Goedel's incompleteness evidence. XIII 157 Predicate Logic/completeness/Goedel/Quine: Goedel proved its completeness in 1930. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |

> Counter arguments against **Quine**

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-27