Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability.
A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence.
B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas.
C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Saul A. Kripke on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
I 47/48 Necessary and a priori are not obviously synonymous. They are not even coextensive: there are both: necessary truths from posteriori and probably contingent truths a priori! >Necessary/Kripke, >necessary a posteriori, >necessary de re/Kripke, >a priori/Kripke. Many people have thought that these two things should mean the same thing because they imagine we would go through all possible worlds in our minds and then be able to recognize them a priori. But that is not so clear! I 50 Description: if we call Nixon "the man who won the 1988 election", it will of course be a necessary truth. >Description/Kripke. I 66 Prototype meter/standard meter: someone who thinks that everything you know a priori is necessary might think: "This is the definition of a meter. This is a necessary truth." Kripke: however, he/she does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. >Standard meter, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke. I 68 Rigid: a meter is rigid ((s) "rigid" means that the reference is the same in all possible worlds). Non-rigid: the length of S at time t is non-rigid. The "definition" does not say that the two expressions are synonymous, but rather that we have determined the reference of the expression "one metre" by fixing that it is to be a rigid expression of designations, which in fact has the length S. The term "one metre" is not synonymous with the term "one metre". So it is no necessary truth! And that is because under certain circumstances it would not have been one metre long. One expression is rigid and the other is not. The truth he/she knows is contingent. So I prefer not to call them "analytical." >Analytic/synthetic, >Rigidity, >Contingency. I 77 E.g. a thesis may be true because it is simply a definition. >Definition/Kripke. I 153ff Reference of proper names: Definition of the reference: is given a priori (contingent) - this is not the same as synonymy. Meaning: the meaning is analytical (necessary). Definition: defines reference and expresses truth a priori. I 156 E.g. necessary truth: "Cats are animals". I 175 The phrase "heat is the movement of molecules" expresses a truth a posteriori. I 181 A posteriori: one can experience a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. The philosophical analysis tells us that it was not contingent and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity. --- III 409 Truth/formal languages: understanding the meta language > explicit truth-definition > truth conditions > understanding of the language examined. >Truth conditions, >Understanding._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
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