Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability.
A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence.
B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas.
C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Bertrand Russell on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 4 Truth/Russell: There are objective truths as objects of judgments, but not objective falsehoods a) false: Judgment as relation to a simple object: E.g. that Charles I died on the scaffold - does not work in the case of false judgments. b) for a complex: (Russell pro): Horwich I 9 Truth: exists if the objects have the relation to each other which is claimed in the judgment. >Complex, >Judgment. Horwich I 11 The fact that a judgment is made does not alter the objects - this is how falsehood becomes possible. (1) ((s) explanation: Thus, one can also explain the separation of metalanguage and object language: if there were only object language and judgments were made in the object language, they would change the judged facts. Then no predictions would be possible either.) >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Prediction. 1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 - - - Russell VII 64 Truth/Russell: can only exist if there are also opinions - but it does not depend on the opinions. IV 127 RussellVsHegel: a truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it has to belong to his "essence". - If the nature of a thing should be all truths, then we cannot recognize the "essence" before we know all its relations with all other things in the universe. - But if we use the word "essence" in this sense, we have to assert that a thing can be recognized, even if its "essence" is unknown - or incompletely known. Contradiction: this confuses knowledge of things and knowledge of truth - acquaintance does not imply knowledge of the essence. (> Naturalistic fallacy). Therefore we cannot prove that the universe is a harmonious whole. - - - Tugendhat III 214 Truth/Russell: early: a matter of belief and this one reaction dispo to react near B with "B". Cf. >Stimulus meaning/Quine, >Reliable reactions/Brandom. TugendhatVsRussell: neither reaction nor triggering signs are true/false. This is because there is no assumption that something is this way or that. Therefore no mistake is possible._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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