Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory. The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability. A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence. B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas. C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art. <
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Alfred Tarski on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments

Glüer II 22
Truth theory/Davidson: the defined T-predicate (truth predicate) in the metalanguage can be translated back into the object language and the state before the elimination of the true can be restored.
>Truth predicate
, >Object language, >Metalanguage.
Object language and metalanguage should contain the predicate true.
Davidson, however, can evade the dilemma by not giving a definition. He calls it a definition of truth in Tarski's style, hereafter referred to as T-theory.
Rorty IV (a) 22
True/Tarski: the equivalences between the two sides of the T-sentences do not correspond to any causal relationship.
>Tarski scheme, >Equivalence.
Davidson: there is no way to subdivide the true sentences so that on the one hand they express "factual", while on the other side they do not express anything.
Cf. >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory.
Berka I 396
Truth/Tarski: we start from the classical correspondence theory.
I 399
We interpret truth like this: we want to see all sentences as valid, which correspond to the Tarski scheme - these are partial definitions of the concept of truth. - Objectively applicable: is the truth definition, if we are able, to prove all the mentioned partial definitions on the basis of the meta language.(1)

1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Vol. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8
Berka I 475
Truth-Definition/truth/Tarski: wrong: to assume that a true statement is nothing more than a provable sentence. - This is purely structural.
Problem: No truth-definition must contradict the sentence definition.
N.B.: but this has no validity in the field of provable sentences. - E.g. There may be two contradictory statements that are not provable. - All provable statements are indeed content-wise true. Nevertheless the truth definition must also contain the non-provable sentences.
>Provability, >Definitions.
Berka I 482
Definition true statement/Tarski: x is a true statement, notation
x ε Wr iff. x ε AS
(meaningful statement) and if every infinite sequence of classes satisfies x.
That does not deliver a truth criterion.
>Truth criterion.
No problem: nevertheless the sense of
x ε Wr
(x belongs to the class of true statements) gets understandable and unambiguous.
I 486
Relative Truth/accuracy in the range/Tarski: plays a much greater role than the (Hilbertian) concept of absolute truth, which was previously mentioned - then we modify Definition 22 (recursive fulfillment) and 23 (truth).
As derived terms we will introduce the term of the statement that
a) in a domain of individuals with k elements is correct and
b) of the statement that is true in every domain of individuals.(2)

2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol. 1, Lemberg 1935
Horwich I 111
Truth/Tarski: is a property of sentences - but in the explanation we refer to "facts". - ((s) Quotation marks by Tarski).
Horwich I 124
Truth/true/eliminability/Tarski: truth cannot be eliminated with generalizations if we want to say that all true sentences have a certain property.
E.g. All consequences of true sentences are true.
Also not eliminable: in particular statements of the form "x is true": E.g. the first sentence that Plato wrote, is true.
Because we do not have enough historical knowledge.(3)
((s) The designation "the first sentence..." is here the name of the sentence. This cannot be converted into the sentence itself.
Eliminability: from definition is quite different from that of redundancy.)
>Elimination, >Eliminability, cf. >Redundancy theory.

3. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75
Skirbekk I 156
Definition Truth/Tarski: a statement is true when it is satisfied by all objects, otherwise false.
Skirbekk I 158
Truth/Tarski: with our definition, we can prove the (semantic, not the logical) sentence of contradiction and the sentence definition. - The propositional logic does not include the term true at all.
Truth almost never coincides with provability.
All provable statements are true, but there are true statements that cannot be proved. - Such disciplines are consistent but incomplete.
>Incompleteness/Gödel). There is even a pair of contradictory statements, neither of which is provable.(4)

4. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Tarski I
A. Tarski
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983

K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt 1977

Send Link
> Counter arguments against Tarski
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth ...

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  

Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2023-09-23
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration