Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth, philosophy: a property of sentences, not a property of utterances because utterances are events. See also truth conditions, truth definition, truth functions, truth predicate, truth table, truth theory, truth value, correspondence theory, coherence theory.
The most diverse approaches claim to define or explain truth, or to assert their fundamental indefinability.
A. Linguistic-oriented theories presuppose either a match of statements with extracts of the world or a consistency with other statements. See also truth theory, truth definition, theory of meaning, correspondence theory, coherence theory, facts, circumstances, paradoxes, semantics, deflationism, disquotationalism, criteria, evidence.
B. Action-oriented truth theories take a future realization of states as the standard, which should be reconciled with an aspired ideal. See also reality, correctness, pragmatism, idealization, ideas.
C. Truth-oriented theories of art attribute qualities to works of art under certain circumstances which reveal the future realization of ideal assumed social conditions. See also emphatic truth, fiction, art, works of art.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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E. Tugendhat on Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
I 263 Truth/Tugendhat: an assertion is once and for all true or false, it does not depend on the circumstances or on a situation. >Timeless sentence. I 267 Truth/Tugendhat: One must not have reasons for truth, but know them - difference using reasons/truth reason. - Otherwise lie and deception would be excluded. >Deception. I 285 Truth/Tugendhat: only made possible by reference to spatiotemporal objects - but reference only possible in controlled language use. >Reference. VsRussell: not by pseudo-concept idea. --- III 190 Truth/Tarski/Tugendhat: his definition is not related to verification - TugendhatVsTarski: Scheme to narrow - Reality and subjectivity must be taken into the truth-conception - >Verification, >Truth/Tarski, >Definition of truth/Tarski, >Theory of truth/Tarski. Tugendhat VsMetalanguage >Metalanguage. Judgments point beyond themselves, therefore criteria necessary. >Criteria, >Truth criterion. III 196 Tugendhat: we need to know how we can verify a judgment, otherwise meaningless. >Judgments. III 208 The "dual relationship" (sentence-sense-given), evaporates with Tarski to a simple ratio. >Given, >Correspondence theory._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20