|Truth conditions: the conditions under which statements, propositions, assertions, etc. are true are called truth conditions. In order to understand a sentence, according to some theories, it is sufficient to know its truth conditions. (Compare M. Dummett, Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt, 1992, p. 20). According to these theories, one can understand not only true but also false sentences. See also semantics, sentence meaning, understanding, truth, meaning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Horwich I 127
Facts/truth-definition/Tarski: the reference to facts is missing in the scheme on purpose, Because it is not about truth conditions. - It is only about that we have to assert "snow... is white" if we state "snow...". - So we can keep the respectivement epistemic attitude - we can remain realists, idealists, etc .. - different truth-concept: This would only exist if "snow is white" would be true iff. Snow is not white - Otherwise it would be the same truth-concept - That would not be necessarily absurd.(1)
1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994