Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Truth-functions: truth-functions map truth-values onto other truth-values. In two-valued logic, the two available truth values are "true" or "false" (t/f). The disjunction (A or B) now maps (t or t), (t or f) and (f or t) onto t, and (f or f) onto f. Non-truth-functional semantics differ from truth-functional semantics in that they also take other meanings of the logical links ("and", "or", "if then") into account, for example, expressions such as "nevertheless," "though," "still", whose propositional content corresponds to the "and", but which bring a certain additional expressive force into play. See also truth-functional semantics, truth-conditional semantics, semantics, propositional content.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
V 137
Truth function/Lewis: should represent the belief systems of people. - They do not have to be realistic. Propositions: should be truth functions. - The indicative conditional must have a fixed interpretation of different beliefs - this makes it a probability conditional.
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V 140f
Non- truth-functional/conditional/Lewis: instead: deductive roles of normal connections: instead of equivalence: Inter- deducibility. - Instead of incompatibility: deductive inconsistency instead of necessity: deducibility. - ((s) Deduction does not refer to truth, but to internal correctness.) ((s) > provability).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-03-29
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