Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Truth-functions: truth-functions map truth-values onto other truth-values. In two-valued logic, the two available truth values are "true" or "false" (t/f). The disjunction (A or B) now maps (t or t), (t or f) and (f or t) onto t, and (f or f) onto f. Non-truth-functional semantics differ from truth-functional semantics in that they also take other meanings of the logical links ("and", "or", "if then") into account, for example, expressions such as "nevertheless," "though," "still", whose propositional content corresponds to the "and", but which bring a certain additional expressive force into play. See also truth-functional semantics, truth-conditional semantics, semantics, propositional content.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 252
Every truth function is transparent for designation.
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V 160
Quantifiers/truth function: are indifferent in relation to most differences but not to the difference between finite/infinite. But they are probably indifferent to differences between different infinite cardinalities. (countable/uncountable) - (> Loewenheim).
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VII (f) 118
Universals/Ontology/Truth Functions/Quine: another, bolder way to abstract universals is to make them accessible to quantification.
Thus we expand the truth-functional logic! "(p)", "(Ep)" etc. are then no longer only schematic. They can accept suitable entities as values, especially propositions or better, truth values.
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VII (h) 156ff
Language/Truth Functions/Intensionality/Opacity/Quine: any non-truth functional language leads to opaque contexts. See V 188
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V 188
Science/Opacity/Quine: Solution: Restriction of the scientific language to truth functions and object quantification.
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I 115
The truths of the truth-functional part of logic are the tautologies.
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II 17
Example "As soon as (when) it becomes night, the lamps are lit"
Here "as soon as" is a connecting particle comparable with the truth functions. By chance it rather leads to permanent sentences.
II 192
From today's point of view, quantum logic is nothing more than a further development of the logic of truth functions. The truth value of a truth function can be calculated on the basis of the truth values of the arguments. Why then does quantum logic not become decidable by truth tables?
This validity criterion would be too strict, because the quantified partial expressions are not always independent from each other! However, the truth table is fully functional if all variables are independent of each other.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-03-30
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