## Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||

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Truth-functions: truth-functions map truth-values onto other truth-values. In two-valued logic, the two available truth values are "true" or "false" (t/f). The disjunction (A or B) now maps (t or t), (t or f) and (f or t) onto t, and (f or f) onto f. Non-truth-functional semantics differ from truth-functional semantics in that they also take other meanings of the logical links ("and", "or", "if then") into account, for example, expressions such as "nevertheless," "though," "still", whose propositional content corresponds to the "and", but which bring a certain additional expressive force into play. See also truth-functional semantics, truth-conditional semantics, semantics, propositional content._____________ Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||

Author | Item | Summary | Meta data |
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I 252 Every truth function is transparent for designation. - - - V 160 Quantifiers/truth function: are indifferent in relation to most differences but not to the difference between finite/infinite. But they are probably indifferent to differences between different infinite cardinalities. (countable/uncountable) - (> Loewenheim). - - - VII (f) 118 Universals/Ontology/Truth Functions/Quine: another, bolder way to abstract universals is to make them accessible to quantification. Thus we expand the truth-functional logic! "(p)", "(Ep)" etc. are then no longer only schematic. They can accept suitable entities as values, especially propositions or better, truth values. - - - VII (h) 156ff Language/Truth Functions/Intensionality/Opacity/Quine: any non-truth functional language leads to opaque contexts. See V 188 - - - V 188 Science/Opacity/Quine: Solution: Restriction of the scientific language to truth functions and object quantification. - - - I 115 The truths of the truth-functional part of logic are the tautologies. - - - II 17 Example "As soon as (when) it becomes night, the lamps are lit" Here "as soon as" is a connecting particle comparable with the truth functions. By chance it rather leads to permanent sentences. II 192 From today's point of view, quantum logic is nothing more than a further development of the logic of truth functions. The truth value of a truth function can be calculated on the basis of the truth values of the arguments. Why then does quantum logic not become decidable by truth tables? This validity criterion would be too strict, because the quantified partial expressions are not always independent from each other! However, the truth table is fully functional if all variables are independent of each other. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |

> Counter arguments against **Quine**

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-03-30