Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth Theory, philosophy: In truth theories, the question is whether and how truth is to be defined. Roughly differentiated are
A. Theories on the correspondence of statements with facts (correspondence theories).
B. Theories of internal consistency within a system of statements (coherence theories).
See also truth definition, truth, truth values, truth predicate, deflationism, disquotationalism, disquotation.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Donald Davidson on Truth Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
II 34 Truth Theory/Tarski/Davidson: shows how the truth values of the sentences of L depend on their structures, and why some sentences contain others, and how words perform their function through their relationship to things in the world. >Truth values. Tarski: Meaning as the basic concept. II 35 FosterVsDavidson: Mistake: to overlook that someone could have a clear theory without knowing it. - Then there is no meaning theory. - (Davidson ditto). >Meaning theory. II 37 Truth Theory/Davidson: ""Snow is white" is true" is not an accidental fact about a sentence but a fact that interprets it. - This shows that the ability to interpret does not equal translation. >Interpretation, >Disquotation scheme. - - - I (e) 111 Tarski: defines Truth - Davidson: Truth is an undefined basic concept. - "mine", "wanting to say": presupposes the concept of meaning. l (e) 111 Tarski: proceeds formally, Davidson empirical (laws instead of axioms, empirically verifiable). - - - Glüer II 28f Truth Theory/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Conversely: it is not required of T-equivalences that the right-hand side translates the left-hand side. - Definition Truth-Equivalence/Tarski: true iff the linked sentences (in the schema) have the same truth value under all circumstances. Glüer II 29 Then one must know for Davidson's reinterpreted convention truth (provides only true equivalences) when truth-equivalences are true. - It is therefore not necessary to know the meaning of both object language sentences and meta-language sentences. - ((s) the meaning is not presupposed. TarskiVsDavidson: the meaning of the sentence of both the object language and the meta-language must be known - truth-predicate/DavidsonVsTarski: his truth-predicate must be interpreted - Davidson: then the truth theory is an interpretation theory which, for each statement sentence S, a truth-equivalence derived from its structure, whose right-hand side indicates the truth conditions under which the left-hand side (S) is true. Glüer II 45 Truth Theory/Davidson/Glüer: for unknown language: 3 steps: 1. The totality of the data must be available, interpreter transmits his logic to the foreign language - basis: observations on sentences that are believed to be true at all times ) - 2. Predicates identified as such become the object of the interpretation (fulfillment conditions are approximated via opportunity sentences) - 3. Extension to general sentences (indirectly developed truth conditions). >Truth conditions. Glüer II 54/55 Truth Theory/Davidson: because of malapropisms: not structure, but intension has priority. >Intensions. Glüer II 56 Truth Theory: in principle, only for certain occasions correct - problem: for a theory of competence: there is no distinction anymore between the ability to know a language and to know about the world - language competency fuses with worlds._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-23