Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Truth Theory, philosophy: In truth theories, the question is whether and how truth is to be defined. Roughly differentiated are
A. Theories on the correspondence of statements with facts (correspondence theories).
B. Theories of internal consistency within a system of statements (coherence theories).
See also truth definition, truth, truth values, truth predicate, deflationism, disquotationalism, disquotation.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Michael E. Dummett on Truth Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
III (c) 118 Truth Theory/Dummett: The truth theory presupposes an understanding of the metalanguage. >Metalanguage. - - - Horwich I 459 Truth/Truth Theory/Truth Conditions/Dummett/Rorty: It could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the contents of the right hand side of the T-sentence. ((s) T-sententce: E.g., "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white.) The T-sentence explains nothing, if the meta language contains the >object language - and then the same is true when meta language and object language are separated. Davidson: no single T-sentence says what understanding is, but the whole body. DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolism: with that he admits that the holism can not explain how the speaker comes to the understanding of individual sentences. - Davidson: Language use is not separable into sub-skills. - The T-sentence embodies no skills - or else we would have to assume mental entities.(1). Cf. >Objects of thought. 1. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
||
> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-23