Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Truth Theory, philosophy: In truth theories, the question is whether and how truth is to be defined. Roughly differentiated are A. Theories on the correspondence of statements with facts (correspondence theories). B. Theories of internal consistency within a system of statements (coherence theories). See also truth definition, truth, truth values, truth predicate, deflationism, disquotationalism, disquotation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
II 21
Truth-Theory/Truth-Definition/TarskiVsField: semantic concepts are not necessary and not philosophically interesting for a T-theory.
FieldVsTarski: has only lists for denotation:
(e)(a) (e is a name which denotes a) ⇔ (e is "c1" and a is c1) or (e is "c2" and a is c2) or ...
II 24
Truth-Theory/utterance conditions/Truth/T-theory/Quine: (Quine, 1953b, p. 138) the conditions of expression are all that is needed to make the concept "true" clear. - (Field dito).
E.g. Alabama-Example: a friend says that in the southern state of Alabama is snow which is a foot high. - Therefore, utterance conditions are important.
Question: why do we need causal theories of the reference beyond the Truth-schema? - That does not work anyway, since we are on Neurath's ship. ((s). That is, meanings change in the course of language development). - Still:
Solution/Field: psychological models about the (inner) connection to reality. - (Do not attach a theory from the outside). - This psychological connection is still physical.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-04-09
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