Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Truth Theory, philosophy: In truth theories, the question is whether and how truth is to be defined. Roughly differentiated are A. Theories on the correspondence of statements with facts (correspondence theories). B. Theories of internal consistency within a system of statements (coherence theories). See also truth definition, truth, truth values, truth predicate, deflationism, disquotationalism, disquotation.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 60
Theory of truth / Davidson / Fodor / Lepore: a theory of truth is extensionally adequate when all of its T-sentences are true. - Problem: this is not sufficient E.g. the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" - solution:. materially adequate instead of extensionally adequate. - That is, that P must be a translation of S - This is Tarski s Convention T. - problem: "Translation" - "adequate", "synonym", etc. unclear. - Problem: when radical interpretation would be defined by material adequacy, it would be impossible. - Solution / Davidson: truth as the fundamental concept.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-04-08
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