# Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Truth value: The truth value is that what is attributed to a statement or an interpreted logical formula with regard to whether it is true or false. In classical logic, there are two truth values, true and false. In multi-valued logics there can be three to infinitely many truth values. In the latter case, these are often regarded as probabilities. For trivalent logics, the third value is often "indeterminate", "neither true nor false" or "neither proved nor disproved". See also negation, strong negation, weak negation, intuitionism, probability, fuzzy logic, extensionality.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Truth Values - Dictionary of Arguments

VII (d) 71
Propositional Calculus/indistinguishability/theoretical terms/Quine: "p", "q" etc. refer to propositional concepts, whatever they may be. But we know that propositional concepts like truth values are not distinguishable in terms of the calculus, the expressiveness of the calculus is limited.
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VII (f) 112
Truth Values/Quine: can be allowed as abstract entities.
VII 115
Truth Value/Quine: is not an abstract entity to which we appeal with assertions.
VII (h) 154
Range/Russell: a change in the range of a description is neutral to the truth value of any sentence. Quine: but only if the description designates something.
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Lauener XI 38
Quantification/Lauener/(s): truth values can only be attributed to quantified sentences.
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Quine I 226
Vagueness/Quine: leaves the truth values untouched. Therefore it can be useful.
>Vagueness
.
I 263ff
Truth Value/intension/extension/Quine: in extensional contexts a singular term may be replaced by a singular term with the same name without changing the truth value of the sentence. This is not possible in opaque (intensional) contexts.
>Intensions, >Extensions, >Opacity.
I 266
Opaque Contexts/Truth Value/Frege: in a construction with a propositional attitude, a sentence or term may not denote truth values, a class or an individual, but functions as the "name of a thought" or the name of a property or an "individual concept". ((s) In non-intensional contexts, a sentence in Frege's work designates a truth value, "The True," or "The False". > "Great Fact", >"Slingshot Argument").
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II 192
From today's point of view, quantifier logic is nothing more than a further development of the logic of truth functions. The truth value of a truth function can be calculated on the basis of the truth values of the arguments. Why then does quantifier logic not become decidable by truth tables?
This validity criterion would be too strict because the quantified sub-expressions are not always independent of each other.
Some sub-expressions may turn out to be untrue, but are unworthy of a closer look at an assignment to truth values. See also >Truth tables.
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III 281
Truth value/Existence/Nonexistence/Ontology/Logic/Quine: which truth values have sentences like "Zerberus barking"? (See also >Unicorn example).
The answer "wrong" would be premature.
III 282
Problem: for all sentences that would be wrong, there would be a negation that would be true! Our derivation methods do not prove anything in case the object does not exist. What would have to be proved is based on an unfulfilled condition.
Truth value gap/Quine: comes from everyday language, in logic we have to fill it. And be it arbitrary. Every sentence should have a truth value (true or false).
>Everyday language.
That was the reason for the convenient extension of the term conditional in § 3,m which generally allowed a truth value for the whole conditional. We now need a similar extension for singular terms, which do not describe anything.
But this cannot be achieved by an all-encompassing decision. But this can be done for simple sentences, from which we derive rules for compound sentences.
Def simple predicate: is a predicate if it does not explicitly have the form of a quantification, negation, conjunction, alternation etc. of shorter components.
If a simple predicate is applied to a singular term that does not denote anything, the sentence in question is to be considered false. Then e.g. "Zerberus barks" is wrong, because it represents an application of the predicate "[1] barks" to "Zerberus".
V 112
Truth values/Language learning/Quine: truth values correspond to a more advanced level of learning. Using different theories for different subject areas
V 113
we finally learn (if at all) which judgement to make in the indeterminate cases of conjunction or alternation in the middle of the table.
Logic/Learn languages/Quine: bivalent logic is a theoretical product which, like all theory, is only learned indirectly. How, we can only speculate about that.
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VI 128
Singular terms/truth value/sense/divalued logic/unicorn/Quine: in the case of unrelated singular terms or failed descriptions, we may not know the truth value. It is not profitable to describe such sentences as meaningless, since the existence of the object could turn out (e.g. Pluto).
It is alright to leave the truth value open, but not the meaning of a sentence!
VI 129
Singular terms/truth value/sense/divalued logic/unicorn/Quine: in the case of unrelated singular terms or failed descriptions, we may not know the truth value. It is not profitable to describe such sentences as meaningless, since the existence of the object could turn out (e.g. Pluto).
It is alright to leave the truth value open, but not the meaning of a sentence!
VI 131
Antirealism/Sentence of the excluded Middle/Dummett/Quine: Dummett turns against the sentence of the excluded middle with epistemological arguments. (Also Brouwer):
No sentence is true or false, as long as no procedure for the determination of the truth value is known.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Q XI
H. Lauener
Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Values