Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Perception, philosophy: perceptions are conscious or unconscious processings of changes of state or events in the environment or within a living organism. Perceptions are happening in the present. Memories and imaginations are not perceptions. In language usage the expression of perception is used both for the process of perception and for the perceived. See also stimuli, sensations, sense perceptions, computation, memory, ideas._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M. Dummett on Perception - Dictionary of Arguments
I 52 Context here: Husserl, noema, means of perception: Vs Direct perception of "uninterpreted given conditions" Noema: he perceives by means of the noema, but does not perceive it himself nor does he capture it in any other way. >Noema/Husserl. I 55 DummettVsHusserl: His assertion that slipping into idealism will be prevented by the distinction between noema and object is not easily understandable. We cannot say that the subject only perceives the object indirectly, as it is mediated by the noema. because there is no concept of direct perception which we could expose to this. I 64 There can be no vocabulary of characteristics of sensations if one considers them as something that is not affected by their interpretation as perception of an external reality. And if such a vocabulary were be possible, we could not use it. I 94 Husserl: perception is not the act in which the meaning lies. - There can be one perception but different statements (sense). - Or one statement (sense) and different perceptions. Def noema: generalization of the concept of meaning "nothing more than a generalization of the idea of the meaning to all the acts. I 96f Dummett: what exactly is the noema of sensory perception? Wrong: to identify the noema with sensations. >Noema/Dummett. I 36 DummettVsHusserl: the noema is not linguistically deducible. I 99 Def Hyle: sensations are described by Husserl collectively as Hyle. He understands them just like Frege. Only through the noema the act of perception gets an object. Therefore noema and meaning are something that refers to an object in the external world beyond itself. I 99 Dummett: Sensations, however, do not refer to anything, we just have them._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Perception
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19