Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Perception, philosophy: perceptions are conscious or unconscious processings of changes of state or events in the environment or within a living organism. Perceptions are happening in the present. Memories and imaginations are not perceptions. In language usage the expression of perception is used both for the process of perception and for the perceived. See also stimuli, sensations, sense perceptions, computation, memory, ideas.
_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Perception - Dictionary of Arguments

Münch III 296
Definition Perception/Quine/Schnelle: getting aware of an irritation.
Münch III 298
Quine, "the animal responds to the semi-circle on the screen" - SchnelleVsQuine: how does he know that? - Maybe it just avoids pain.

Helmut Schnelle, Introspection and the Description of Language Use“, in: Florian Coulmas (Ed) Festschrift for native speaker, Den Haag 1981, 105-126.
- - -
Quine VI 2
Perception/Quine: Input: is not objects, but activation of our sensory receptors. - We must justify ourselves with stimulus influences. Stimulus influences instead of observation and instead of documents.
>Stimulus/Quine
.
VI 100
Perception/Quine: is neurophysiologically recordable in principle - beliefs cannot be recorded.
V 15
Perception/Quine: this is about form, not about stimuli (these fall under reception).
V 18
Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavioral criteria. It shows itself in the conditioning of reactions.
V 33
Similarity/perception/ontology/Quine: the transition from perception to perceptual similarity brings ontological clarity: perception (the result of the act of perception) is omitted.
V 36
Perception Similarity/Quine: one is inclined to speak here of similarity in certain respects.
V 37
Quine: this is convenient in practice, but dispensable in theory, if you extend similarity as above by many digits.
Learning/Perception/Similarity/Perception Similarity/Quine: in learning, different degrees of similarity must play a role.
N.B.: otherwise any enhanced reaction would be conditioned equally to any future episode, since they would all be equally similar!
N.B.: it follows from this that the standards of perceptual similarity must be innate.
VI 1
Perception/Language/World: our systematic theory about the outside world has evolved over generations. It allows us to predict future sensory stimuli. Thus, amidst the maze of stimuli, we have a theory that helps us to verify predictions.
>Predictions/Quine.
VI 2
Perception/Observation/Quine: what is observation is not easy to analyze. Our input does not consist in objects, but in the activation of our sensory receptors.
We must justify ourselves with stimulus influences, and renounce the objects! (Also on corresponding singular terms).
Def Stimulus Influence/Quine: the temporally ordered set of all perceptual receptors of the subject that are activated at an event.
VI 3
Observation/Quine: this is how we manage to renounce the term "observation" as an independent technical term! (In favour of stimulus influence).
VI 26
Perception/Quine: I have always spoken of neuronal receptors and their stimulation and never of sense data. (>Naturalized Epistemology). Sense Data/Quine: are cartesian! >Cartesianism.
VI 86
Perception/Learning/Language/Quine: two of Otto's perception situations that it is raining will differ not only in time, but also in neuronal terms.
They are probably too complicated to be described neuronally at all, since there are many different signs of rain.
But there must still be some common neuronal characteristic for the class of these processes, because after all it was stimulus generalizations that were responsible for Otto learning it.
Then we can transfer this class to a whole population. However, it is even more inaccessible because the nervous systems of different individuals are networked differently.
VI 89
Perception/Criteria/Quine: of things: Example "x perceives that p". Problem: the light in which we see an object always comes from the sun or another source.
VI 90
Can we resort to criteria?
No: because we also want to allow a bowl to be perceived by the fact that it is reflected in something.
Solution: focal point: we want to distinguish between seeing a glass and seeing through this glass. But causal relationships and the focal point are not yet sufficient. Some part of the surface of our bowl would satisfy this condition no less than the whole bowl itself.
VI 91
So we need whole sentences to get through them to the terms.
VI 92
Perception/Quine: For example "x perceives that p" drives the speech of perceptions to undreamt-of heights. So we should even notice that Newton's laws imply Kepler's!
But condition: only on the occasion of the situation in which we take note for the first time that p, they say of us, we noticed that p.
VI 93
Perception/Quine: is only one event in a subject at a time. We register foreign perceptions through the behavior of a subject and our empathy.
VI 94
It is more difficult to empathize with the belief of others: although we understand the belief of the dog that he will get his food, how do we understand that someone believes in transubstantiation during the Eucharist? >Behaviorism.
VI 100
Perception/Quine: we have already seen that a neurological generalization of our perceptions is not possible because of the different situations, viewpoints and different neural networks.
Nevertheless, every perception is in principle completely describable using strictly neurological terms! However, this does not apply to belief.

_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Send Link

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Y   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-02-27
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration