Warning: ini_set(): Headers already sent. You cannot change the session module's ini settings at this time in /kunden/393255_14059/webseiten/enV2/listview-details.php on line 2

Deprecated: The each() function is deprecated. This message will be suppressed on further calls in /kunden/393255_14059/webseiten/enV2/datenbank/meta_data_inc.php on line 60
John R. Searle on Perception - Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Perception, philosophy: perceptions are conscious or unconscious processings of changes of state or events in the environment or within a living organism. Perceptions are happening in the present. Memories and imaginations are not perceptions. In language usage the expression of perception is used both for the process of perception and for the perceived. See also stimuli, sensations, sense perceptions, computation, memory, ideas.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Skirbekk Wahrheitstheorien Frankurt/M 1996
I 28
Meanings in the head (SearleVsPutnam), because perception is self-referential - perception provides itself the fulfillment conditions.
---
Skirbekk I 78ff
Perception/Searle: we perceive the whole house, not just facades, but that is no inference. - Perception is linked to a representation system (e.g. language). -> E.G. Barn facades/Goldman, > Reliability Theory/Goldman; > more autors on Reliability Theory.
---
Searle II 296
Perception/Searle: nailed to the world: by the causal self-referentiality of intentional content. - (s) the perception delivers the satisfaction conditions that the object must have) - name/proper name/Searle: here there is no intentional causation.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Skirbekk I
G. Skirbekk (Hg)
Wahrheitstheorien
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt 1977

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Perception ...

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-10-15
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration