Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Signs: signs are recognizable and definable forms that an observer can assign to two domains. The first domain is the repertoire of available forms that allows a distinction of similarity and dissimilarity within this domain, the second domain is a set of objects which also distinguishes between similarity and dissimilarity between these objects as well as distinguishing the objects of the second domain from the forms of the first domain. There are no signs without observation or interpretation. See also language, words, symbols, icons, systems, image, image theory, pictures, assignment._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gottlob Frege on Signs - Dictionary of Arguments
II 31 Signs/Frege: as long as e.g. the plus sign is used only between integers ("a + b"), it only needs to be explained for this purpose. If other objects are to be linked, e.g. "sun" with something else, the plus sign must be redefined. >Definition, >Definability, >Connectives, >Equal sign, >Copula. II 41 Frege: a sign is a proxy. >Proxy. II 88 Numeral/Frege: e.g. "2" is saturated. In contrast: the functional character, e.g. "sin" (sine, sinus) is unsaturated. >Unsaturated. II 91 Sign/Frege: signs are the requirements for conceptual thinking - they no longer refer to the individual thing, but to what several things have in common. - - - I 127 Sign/FregeVsFormalism: empty signs are only black spots on paper. Their use would be a logical error. Empty signs do not solve any task. E.g. x + b = c: if b > c, there is no natural number x that can be inserted - nor to accept the difference (c - b) as an artificial new sign. Sign/Frege: and where a solution is possible, the sign is not the solution, but the meaning of the sign. - - - Husted V 130 FregeVsFormalism: formalism only gives instructions for definitions, not definitions themselves. >Formalism. - - - Frege I 131 E.g. Number i: the meaning of "total" must be re-explained. FregeVsHilbert: it is not enough just to call for a sense._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg), Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18