Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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I 54
Pointing/McDowell: What we are finally encountering is a content that is still conceivable, and not something that would be more fundamental, namely, a naked pointing or a piece of givenness.
We do not stop with our seeing just before the facts (Wittgenstein) we see that something is so and so.
I 64
Pointing/McDowell: we fall victim to the myth of what is given when we assume that the pointing gestures had to break through a boundary which surrounds the sphere of conceivable content.
I 194
Ostension/Concept/McDowell: E.g. "It looks like this" - does not have to be any less conceptual than what it is a reason for.
We can only get to grips with the rational relationship if we understand it conceptually, even if, according to our theory (Evans), the content would not be conceptual.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-29
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