Pointing/McDowell: What we are finally encountering is a content that is still conceivable, and not something that would be more fundamental, namely, a naked pointing or a piece of givenness.
We do not stop with our seeing just before the facts (Wittgenstein) we see that something is so and so.
Pointing/McDowell: we fall victim to the myth of what is given when we assume that the pointing gestures had to break through a boundary which surrounds the sphere of conceivable content.
Ostension/Concept/McDowell: E.g. "It looks like this" - does not have to be any less conceptual than what it is a reason for.
We can only get to grips with the rational relationship if we understand it conceptually, even if, according to our theory (Evans), the content would not be conceptual._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,