Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Time: A. Time is a dimension in which events are arranged. At first, no direction (before / after) is defined with this. A time direction can be obtained in the context of the Second Principle of Thermodynamics. However, a global framework must be assumed, within which there is an increase of entropy. The assumption of increasing entropy does not apply to the comparison of local events. B. In the case of the subjective time, the question of direction is less problematic. The perceived time direction is expressed by the learned use of the terms "before" and "after". See also time arrow, time travel, time reversal, symmetry, duration, space time, relativity theory, four-dimensionalism, world lines._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D. Lewis on Time - Dictionary of Arguments
V 32 Time/Arrow of time/Past/Future/Lewis: future: depends counterfactually (not only causally) on the present. >Causal dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis. Asymmetry: former things do not depend on later ones - we find no counterfactual conditional that explains what would have been different in the past if the presence was different - such a counterfactual conditional would be unclear at most. V 33 Asymmetry: we can use all assumptions about the past, but not about the future - assumptions about the past are not counter factually dependent - therefore they can serve as auxiliary hypotheses. V 35 Time/Asymmetry/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Asymmetry: comes about like this: wA>wC assumes that C is later, if C is earlier, the counterfactual conditionals are only true if C is true - the counterfactual conditional tells us, like the way, how things are earlier, not depending on how things are later. V 36 Time Arrow/Epistemic/Asymmetry/Lewis: the asymmetry (that we know more about the past than about the future) is gradual, no difference in kinds. V 37f Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Lewis: 1) the epistemic contrast (that we know more about the past) is gradual. - 2) (irrelevant) - 3) Even determinism would allow an asymmetry. - 4) past, present and future are equally unchangeable. - That t is later, is irrelevant. V 38 5) in a sense we can change the future by our present actions, however. - Asymmetry: branch in the future: are the alternatives under counterfactual assumptions. - Past: here the fact remains the same, even in counterfactual assumptions. V 57 Time/Laws of Nature /LoN/Asymmetry/Lewis: if there is an asymmetry (between past and future). - Then it is a property of time, not of the laws. - It makes a difference between possible worlds. >Possible world/Lewis. V 66 Asymmetry/Time/Lewis: my argument for it is empirical. - Too many traces would have to be hidden later on. --- V 94 Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Possible world/Lewis: the asymmetry is contingent. - i.e. the properties which justify the distinction between past and future opportunities. They may be different from possible worlds to other possible worlds. >Asymmetry, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Time traveller/Lewis, >Timelessness/Lewis._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19