Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Accessibility, philosophy: accessibility is an expression of a relationship between possible worlds. For example, a world with IT technology is not accessible from a world where the wheel has not yet been invented. See also modal logic, possible worlds, systems, S 4/S 5, knowledge, transitivity, counterpart theory, centered worlds, cross world identity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Saul A. Kripke on Accessibility - Dictionary of Arguments
I Berka 161 Def Accessibility/possible world/Kripke/Berka: the relation R exists if the world w2 is possible with reference to world w1 in the sense that every sentence which is true in w2 is possible in w1. Necessity/Kripke: a sentence is necessary in a world w1 if it is true in all worlds accessible from w1. Def normal world/Kripke: a normal world has a maximum consistent quantity of sentences in which at least one statement is necessary. Definition non-normal world/Kripke: in non-normal worlds, every sentence of type LB is false. >Possible world/Kripke, >Normal world/Kripke._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |