Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Future: future is a collective term for a set of events that occurs or could occur temporally after the present. In contrast to the set of past events, which cannot be changed, the future can be shaped within a certain framework. See also past, present, time, truth.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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W.V.O. Quine on Future - Dictionary of Arguments

VI 127f
Future/QuineVsAristotle: E.g. "tomorrow’s sea battle": tomorrow’s sea battle does not exist. Therefore there are no statements about it. Not even the statement that "it is not true now"... -assumes 1) omniscient God - 2) determinism - is incompatible with our freedom of action.
Freedom/Quine: we do what we decide to do - whether decisions are determined is not the issue - Sentence of the Excluded Middle: is definitely valid but is at most, incomplete - ambiguous propositions are not true, but the corresponding propositions - Completion: does not lie in the future, though - ((s) ...but lies in information - truth value: can be left open, but not the meaning of the sentence.)
>Excluded Middle/Quine.
VI 129
Pro three-valued logic: truth value, and not whether the sentence makes sense, would depend on the existence of the unicorn - as it should be - Vs: Problem: there are too many truth-function combinations.
>Truth Values/Quine.
XIII 73
Future/Quine:
XIII 74
Question: are sentences about the future neither true nor false (without truth value) until the matter is decided?
Aristotle: pro. This is still supported today by some theologians.
Future/Theology: if a sentence about the future is already true today, God must know it, but then determinism also follows from it. But that is a different kind of determinism than the one discussed under "freedom of will".
Problem: then people can no longer act freely and free action is a prerequisite for praise and blame, sin and grace.
Quine: I hope the reader is not convinced by my presentation of the argument.
Prediction/future/statement/solution/Quine: Thesis: statements about the future are true or false when made, however capricious or unfounded they may be.
Advantage: only if we accept this, we can treat time and space on one level. Namely, time as the 4th dimension.
Ethics/Morality/Time/Future/Quine: also for the moral discussion we get advantages from it: Example
Dilemma: a) Environmental protection benefits people as well as the unborn,
b) Birth control benefits the environment. But with this we deny the rights of the unborn.
Four-Dimensionalism/future/past/resolution/Quine: Thesis: future and past objects and people are just as real as present ones.
XIII 75
Timeless: timelessly spoken, unborn babies are just as real and their interests are to be respected in the same way.
Birth control: people who are never born because of it are a fiction. Such people do not exist, not even timelessly! Ethics/Morality/Future/Non-Existence/Quine: in this way nobody's right is violated by birth control.
Four-Dimensionalism/Possibilia/Quine: four-dimensionalism creates a place in the sun for all future actualities, however unpredictable, but it is no consolation or help for mere possibilities.
Actual/Possibilia/Quine: the rights of the non-updated are contingent on their actualization.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-09-18
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