Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Future: future is a collective term for a set of events that occurs or could occur temporally after the present. In contrast to the set of past events, which cannot be changed, the future can be shaped within a certain framework. See also past, present, time, truth._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Future - Dictionary of Arguments
VI 127f Future/QuineVsAristotle: E.g. "tomorrow’s sea battle": tomorrow’s sea battle does not exist. Therefore there are no statements about it. Not even the statement that "it is not true now"... -assumes 1) omniscient God - 2) determinism - is incompatible with our freedom of action. Freedom/Quine: we do what we decide to do - whether decisions are determined is not the issue - Sentence of the Excluded Middle: is definitely valid but is at most, incomplete - ambiguous propositions are not true, but the corresponding propositions - Completion: does not lie in the future, though - ((s) ...but lies in information - truth value: can be left open, but not the meaning of the sentence.) >Excluded Middle/Quine. VI 129 Pro three-valued logic: truth value, and not whether the sentence makes sense, would depend on the existence of the unicorn - as it should be - Vs: Problem: there are too many truth-function combinations. >Truth Values/Quine. XIII 73 Future/Quine: XIII 74 Question: are sentences about the future neither true nor false (without truth value) until the matter is decided? Aristotle: pro. This is still supported today by some theologians. Future/Theology: if a sentence about the future is already true today, God must know it, but then determinism also follows from it. But that is a different kind of determinism than the one discussed under "freedom of will". Problem: then people can no longer act freely and free action is a prerequisite for praise and blame, sin and grace. Quine: I hope the reader is not convinced by my presentation of the argument. Prediction/future/statement/solution/Quine: Thesis: statements about the future are true or false when made, however capricious or unfounded they may be. Advantage: only if we accept this, we can treat time and space on one level. Namely, time as the 4th dimension. Ethics/Morality/Time/Future/Quine: also for the moral discussion we get advantages from it: Example Dilemma: a) Environmental protection benefits people as well as the unborn, b) Birth control benefits the environment. But with this we deny the rights of the unborn. Four-Dimensionalism/future/past/resolution/Quine: Thesis: future and past objects and people are just as real as present ones. XIII 75 Timeless: timelessly spoken, unborn babies are just as real and their interests are to be respected in the same way. Birth control: people who are never born because of it are a fiction. Such people do not exist, not even timelessly! Ethics/Morality/Future/Non-Existence/Quine: in this way nobody's right is violated by birth control. Four-Dimensionalism/Possibilia/Quine: four-dimensionalism creates a place in the sun for all future actualities, however unpredictable, but it is no consolation or help for mere possibilities. Actual/Possibilia/Quine: the rights of the non-updated are contingent on their actualization._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2023-03-24