|Sorites: the term is derived from the Greek word soros for pile and denotes the difficulty of specifying the point at which the expression “pile” can no longer be applied because the amount of the substance concentrated on the pile is reduced. A similar problem relates to the delineation of color shades. See also vagueness, limits, indeterminacy, perception, chain closure, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Robert Adams on Sorites - Dictionary of Arguments
Field II 297
Adams-Conditional/Sorites/Field: in Sorites, the generalized Adams conditional leads to all assumptions being highly credible, even for the clearest borderline cases. But the Sorites argument does not preserve the credibility in this reading.
Probability function P/Field: from several different P, the same Q can be constructed, so P is not really important to describe the agent. Then one could say:
1. That Q is a fully legitimated belief function.
2. That P is not a legitimate belief function. This would be hard to justify if the process from P to Q could be repeated so that it provides a Q* that is different from Q, but that is not the case. If we define Q*(A) as Q(DA), then Q* is simply equal to Q. This is our reason for using S4._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994