Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Logic: logic is the doctrine of the admissibility or inadmissibility of relations between statements and thus the validity of the compositions of these statements. In particular, the question is whether conclusions can be obtained from certain presuppositions such as premises or antecedents. Logical formulas are not interpreted at first. Only the interpretation, i. e. the insertion of values, e.g. objects instead of the free variables, makes the question of their truth meaningful._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G. E. M. Anscombe on Logic - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 79 I/AnscombeVsLogic: the logicians never have concepts of their objects because they do not need them. So you cannot come close to the "I", or cannot find its meaning. Frank I 88 "I"/Logic/Anscombe: from the point of view of logicians, "I" is certainly a proper name. Frank I 88/89 E.g. Suppose we have a company in which everyone is labeled with two names. 1. The one appears on the back and another on the upper end of the chest (?) (These names, which cannot be seen by the wearers, are different for the wearers, say from "B" to "Z". (?). "The other name, "A" is imprinted on the inside of their wrists and the same for everyone. One learns to respond to utterances of the name on one's own chest and back. Self-reports are then made on the basis of conclusions and testimony. E.g. "B" draws conclusions, expressed by sentences with "A" as the subject, from the statements of other people who use "B" as the subject. There are reports from B's mouth that say that A did this and that, these are prima facie verified by finding out that B did it. Thus there is a person for each person, of whom he/she has characteristic limited, but also characteristic, privileged views. Fra I 90 This does not include self-consciousness. Although everyone knows a lot of the object he/she actually is. >Self-consciousness. Vs: the thesis that these people do not have self-consciousness may not seem right for this particular reason. B has consciousness of, i.e. he/she watches some of B's and thus his/her own activities. So he is conscious of himself. So he has self-consciousness. AnscombeVs: when we speak of self-consciousness, we do not mean this. We mean something that is expressed by the use of "I" as opposed to "A". >I, Ego, Self, >Subject, >Self._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank, Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19