E.g. Nothing verifies however in a c">
|Verification, philosophy: verification means determining the truth value ("true" or "false") of statements that refer to the observable. The admissible means of verification are determined by the theories, the statements belong to. See also verificationism, confirmation, certainty, empiricism, foundation, proof, manifestation, understanding, generalization._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
G. E. M. Anscombe on Verification - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 107
I/Identity/Verification/Anscombe: E.g. "I am standing" is verified by my standing body.
E.g. Nothing verifies however in a comparable way "I see a variety of colors"!
Anscombe: one could say: "the thought"! But the question is, what it means for the thought to be verified like this?
The Cartesian thoughts all have the same character, that in their descriptions they are little different from the descriptions of the events and the persons on whom they could be verified.
Even if there are such processes, then the thoughts are not thoughts of such processes, such as the thought of standing.
G. Elizabeth M.Anscombe (1975a): The First Person, in:
Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) (I975): Mind and Language: Wolfson College
Lectures 1974, Oxford 1975,45-65_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
G.E. M. Anscombe
"The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank, Frankfurt/M. 1994
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994