Geach: then we get a">

Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Subject, philosophy: the subject is, in the most general sense, the originator of actions and creativity as well as bearer of ideas, beliefs, perceptions, feelings and moods. In the tradition of German idealism the subject is opposed to the object. More recently, there has been a shift in the focus of the discussion to questions of access to internal states. See also I, self, subjectivity, object, idealism, actions, action theory.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Aristotle on Subjects - Dictionary of Arguments

Geach I 48
Subject/predicate/Aristotle: each predicate can be a substantive (but not: e.g. "this white is tree").
Geach: then we get a
"two-term theory": the sentence then consists of similar parts.
GeachVs: E.g. Lord Home became Prime Minister - not: "Lord Home became Churchill".
>Predication
, >Sentence, >Statemment, >Propositional logic.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18
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