Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Minimalism, philosophy: here, in particular, minimalist truth theories. The thesis of minimalism is that truth can be gained from the W-schema by Tarski Wr (S) <> p (e.g. "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white) without accepting additional objects. It differs from deflationism in that it does not deny truth any substantial properties. See also deflationism, disquotationalism, inflationism, truth theory, truth definition, truth._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Paul Boghossian on Minimalism - Dictionary of Arguments
Wright I 271 Boghossian: Global minimalism, Non-Factualism: they are related to meaning, not truth: there is no property that a word means something, hence there is no fact - global minimalism attracts global non-factualism unlike any other non-factualism. >Minimalism, >Nonfactualism, >Facts. Wright I 285 Boghossian: "global minimalism": minimalism of truth tilts also all meaning. >Meaning, >Meaning theory, >Truth, >Truth theory. Wright I 291 Meaning-Minimalism/Boghossian, new/Wright: the meaning-minimalism does not have to lead to a global minimalism: the meaning-minimalism is rather bound to contradictory theses and does not provide a coherent explanation for the behavior of the truth predicate. >Truth predicate. For the meaning-minimalism should accept any of the following assertions: (5) The predicate "has the truth condition that P" does not refer to a property. (6) For every proposition S and propositional content P, "S has the truth condition that P" is not truth conditional. >Truth conditions, >Truth conditional semantics. Wright: and these assertions are indeed inconsistent: (5) is necessarily followed by (7): I 292 (7) "true" refers to a property. >Properties, While (6) necessarily entails the negation of (7). Cf. >Deflationism. I 294 Boghossian: one has to decide whether truth is robust or deflationary. Just as unavoidable, but not to mix with this, is a decision between... I 295 A) the concept of a correspondence of language and (objective) world, or B) the concept of a language-bound operator of the semantic ascent (words instead of objects). >Correspondence, >World, >Language, >World/Thinking, >Semantic Ascent. Solution/Wright: The meaning-minimalist must work with a pluralistic truth opinion (different living beings have different cognitive faculties)! (> Pluralism). >Pluralism, cf. >Hetero-phenomenology, >Cognition, >Knowledge._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bogh I Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007 Boghe I Peter Boghossian A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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> Counter arguments against Boghossian
> Counter arguments in relation to Minimalism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18