|Experience: a) reflected perception, which can be compared with prior perceptions and can be processed linguistically. See also events, perception, sensations, empiricism.|
b) an event that is processed in the consciousness of a subject. No mere imagination. See also events, imagination, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
|Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986
Chisholm II 229
Experience/Concept/Brentano: if someone has an inner experience, then he has a concept of this experience. E.g. fear of ghosts. >Concept/Brentano.
Then he is also in a position to imagine the corresponding vividly. >Imagination.
I cannot currently have the fearsome experience, but I can have the disposition to be able to imagine it vividly.
If someone judges a concept of inner experience, then he also knows that what he judges is the case. >Judgement/Brentano._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004