|Ontology: is the set of material or immaterial objects, of which a theory assumes that it can make statements about them. According to classical logic, an existence assumption must be assumed. In other fields of knowledge, the question of whether relations really exist or are merely mental constructs, is not always regarded as decisive as long as one can work with them. Immaterial objects are e.g. linguistic structures in linguistics. See also existence, mathematical entities, theoretical entities, theoretical terms, reality, metaphysics, semantic web.<_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Franz Brentano on Ontology - Dictionary of Arguments
Chisholm II 267
Ontology/Brentano/Hedwig: Brentano's ontlogy is "sober": there are only "things" that are presented and recognized as "being".
Hedwig: precisely for this reason, it is surprising that Brentano calls fiction "useful" and "convenient" and "practical". >Fictions.
Brentano: must concede a rethink to the Copernican who speaks Ptolemaic. For Brentano, the difference that arises here is closed by thinking, the "noetic consciousness". There is no sensual evidence.
VsBrentano: the strength of this epistemology is also its weakness: sensory perception falls under the rule of a epistemological option. >Sensory impressions.
Brentano: (already early): Mind and inner perception are to be evaluated completely analogously. (Vs Thomas Aquinas).
VsBrentano: Question: To what extent can the genetic origin of an idea motivated by an emotion be brought in itself epistemologically and made evident by this idea?
Brentano cannot do this, even if he refers back to the evidence of secondary consciousness. That is, that the psychic appears to be preceded by a field of affects which remains dark and cannot be recognized in itself,
but only in its effect on the act of cognition. >Cognition.
Ontology/Brentano: Being is synonymous with thing.
Chisholm II = Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004