Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Psychology: Psychology is the scientific study of mind and behavior. It encompasses human development, cognition, emotion, personality, social behavior, and mental disorders. See also Stages of Development, Social Behavior, Behavior, Personality, Personality traits, Emotion, Cognition._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Franz Brentano on Psychology - Dictionary of Arguments
Chisholm II 222 Descriptive psychology/Brentano/Marek: is an a priori science, not an empirical necessity. In this respect, it approaches Husserl's phenomenology. Brentano, however, did not go so far as to speak of a knowledge of being. The conceptual necessity is founded in thought, and not in the "unreal" entities themselves. II 223 Definition descriptive psychology/Brentano: subdivision, does not replace the genetic, empirical investigations, but can serve as their basis. Descriptive psychology: is responsible for the empirical, conceptual area. Task: to determine the elements of consciousness and their connections. "Psychognosia". Their statements are a priori, not empirical; II 224 To determine the parts of the soul phenomena; to determine separability or inseparability. Consciousness is uniform, but therefore not something simple but composed. Definition genetic psychology/Brentano: attempts to specify the conditions with which the individual phenomena are causally linked, empirically. >Consciousness, >Thought, >Thinking, >Reality, >World/Thinking. Chisholm II = Johann Christian Marek Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 --- Chisholm II 235 Psychology/Brentano/Baumgartner: central term: to notice something, explicit perception. Psychognosia/Brentano: pure psychology, while genetic psychology could be called a physiological psychology. Psychognosia: exact science, captures its object directly. Genetic psychognosia: is not exact science, since it also takes into account relations to e.g. chemical processes. II 237 Descriptive psychology/perception/Brentano: "primary object": intentional reference to something. At the same time Secondary object: because it refers to itself at the same time. II 238 For example, someone who hears a sound is heard, has sound as the the primary object as the object of his idea. His hearing of the sound captures it as a secondary object of the idea at the same time. Self-reference next to the object reference. The own hearing is also perceived. Therefore the evident (inner) perception has a judicial character. II 239 Noticing/Brentano: makes the parts of the consciousness and their relationship clear. II 240 Accident/Substance/Psychology/Brentano: "all the psychic things we apperceive are composed. It is an accident which includes the soul-substance, or a plurality of accidents of the same substance, each of which contains them." Baumgartner: Our substance is not doubled thereby. And it is not halved if one of the accidents is dispensed with. Wilhelm Baumgartner Vom Bemerken oder wie man ein rechter Psychognost wird in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |