Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Pain, philosophy of mind: the philosophical discussion deals with the peculiarities of the concept of pain in contrast to other concepts such as perceptions, sensations and stimuli. In particular, it is about the relationship between physical and mental realization of pain. See also mind body problem, physical/psychic, rigidity, possible worlds, possible world semantics, perception, introspection, private language, necessity, certainty._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stanley Cavell on Pain - Dictionary of Arguments
I (a) 44 Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: different objects require very different identity criteria. E.g. in the case of sensations, style, colors, diseases, for example, it may be a description, in the case of material objects it may be a place. >Identity, >Identity conditions, >Criteria. I (a) 45 Pain/Identity/Cavell: it seems as if we could say of pain and of cars, but not of colors: in a certain way there are two, but in a certain way only one. >Colors. Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sence perceptions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application. Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would be the same! E.g. Cavell: one can say our "twin cars" do not differ, yet there are two. Why not with pain then? Because here "equals" means "descriptively equal"? Obviously not! >Description, >Imagination, >Equality. I (a) 46 Why should not the skeptics have the feeling that here it is presupposed what is still to be examined? For example, in cars, the question is answered: there are two, in the case of colors, the question is also answered: it is one! But with pain? Pain/Malcolm: there is a danger to think it is here as in the colors, styles, opinions or sudden ideas. It is a truism that there can be the same shades of color at the same time in many places. Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors of headaches are different. But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical with its: namely, not! However, we have the same insidious pain which Dr. Eternity describes as part of the eternity syndrome! I (a) 47 Malcom only shows, by adjusting the pain to the colors, how both are counted or identified by means of descriptions. Only in this respect they then behave like cars! Colors cannot be counted differently, but this does not show that pain cannot be counted differently! If I were put under pressure here, I would even say that pain in this respect is more like objects than colors. I (a) 48 Pain/Cavell: Thesis: in pain it is important that the other needs our attention! This makes it so important to know how strong the pain is. This seems to make a standard description necessary. Physical identity (i.e., empirical indistinguishability) is not sufficient: for example, two peas in a pod can be indistinguishable, but we do not say it is one pea! >Indiscernibility, >Indistinguishability, >Countability, >Similarity, >Classification, >Identification. I (a) 49 However, it is not necessary either, because if there is a standard description that secures the application of "(descriptive) equal", then we can tolerate an unlimited discrepancy._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18