Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Skepticism: is an expression for the more or less well-formulated view that perceptual subjects cannot in principle have any security with regard to their knowledge about the external world. The doubts about the reliability of the sensory organs can be extended to doubts about the existence of an external world, if the possibility of a fundamental deception, for example by a permanent dream, is accepted. See also verification, evidence, perception, certainty, Moore's hands, solipsism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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St. Cavell on Skepticism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 13 Skepticism/Cavell: his skeptical impulse is bound to the belief that we must (and be able to) speak outside of the limits of the language game. >Language game. The lack of a secure connection between words and the world is not a mistake of language but lies in the way we use it in our lives with language. >Language and thought, >World/thinking, >Word meaning, >Language use. I 22 Skepticism/Cavell: skepticism is more a dodge from the other person, a rejection of responsibility and perils. This has a certain tragic dimension that Cavell finds in Shakespeare and Ibsen. - - - I (a) 42 Belief/Cavell: The points at which the philosophers interfere with each other or with the healthy common understanding are not about "beliefs". >Beliefs. The skeptic's challenge is not against our beliefs, but against the reason on which our beliefs are based, our ability to believe at all. >Foundation. Skepticism/Cavell: skepticism may not be reason, but it cannot be harder to understand it than irrationality. The first fact that comes to light through him is that the vocation to what we say is not equal to a testimony what we all believe. I (a) 43 It seems as if the critic of skepticism must not prove that the skeptic must accept his truth in the end, but that his own test failed. CavellVs: but it is not a matter of agreeing here on individual propositions! (Like Wittgenstein): we do not believe, for example, that the world exists! It would also be empty, e.g. to agree on that it exists! You could also immediately decide that it exists! It is not about reconciling diverging positions. >Certainty, >Moore's hands._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell, Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.), Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Cavell
> Counter arguments in relation to Skepticism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18