Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Features, philosophy: Features are fundamentally characteristics, however in the philosophical terminology according to Frege it has become natural to speak of (necessary) characteristics, but in objects of (contingent) properties. Objects do not have their properties necessarily, they can always be different. Concepts, on the other hand, have their characteristics necessarily. E.g. that circles are round is a necessary characteristic of the concept circle, but not a necessary property of drawn circles. It is, however, not the concept which has the characteristic itself, but the objects which fall under it.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Richard Dawkins on Features - Dictionary of Arguments

I 156
Feature/phenotype/gene/Dawkins: any feature such as e.g. a green beard is merely a method by which a gene can "recognize" copies of itself in other individuals.

Feature/altruism/Dawkins: according to the thesis that genes try to help copies of themselves in the bodies of others, features are developed.
Perhaps a gene for altruism can thus be recognized in altruistic behavior?
In fact, relationships are recognized in behavior. For example, the parents' selflessness towards their offspring.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Da I
R. Dawkins
The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976
German Edition:
Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996

Da II
M. St. Dawkins
Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993
German Edition:
Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-25
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