Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Sensory Impressions, philosophy: the concept of impression is intended to serve as a boundary to the concept of perception. It places the weight on information not yet processed on the side of the receiving subject. Perception, on the other hand, refers to prepared information, which allows classification, storage and evaluation. See also stimuli, perception, sensations, input, information, qualia._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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R. Descartes on Sensory Impressions - Dictionary of Arguments
Stroud I 8 Senses/Descartes: Even if we know that we can be deceived, it is not wiser to assume that we are always being deceived than to think we would never be. Stroud: we should not assume all our senses to be fundamentally unreliable. >Deceptions. Stroud I 16 Senses/Knowledge/Descartes: E.g. If he knows that he is sitting at the fireplace, he thinks that he knows it due to the senses. But he also knows that it is compatible with the fact that he is only dreaming. VsDescartes: if we allow a dreaming person to know something (e.g. mathematics, mathematical truths), does this not show that Descartes is wrong with his skepticism? VsVs: this is not shown by that. >Certainty, >Skepticism, >Knowledge, >Perception._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |