Economics Dictionary of Arguments

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Attributive/referential: difference in reference - attributive "whoever it is" (may not be identified) - referential the identified object.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Keith Donnellan on Attributive/referential - Dictionary of Arguments

I 183
Def Referential/Donnellan: is supposed to enable the listener to single out the person the speaker is talking about. - E.g. "The killer of Schmidt is insane": in any case, the person who rioted in court, even if he is not the killer. - Here, empty descriptions do not fail. - ((s) The description may also be wrong, and still identify the person.)
Attributive/Donnellan: "whoever it is": E.g. An absent murderer can be anyone, but definitely the murderer - ((s), the description must be apply).
>Descriptions
.
I 191
Referential/Donnellan: Here it is probable that the speaker believes that the reference is satisfied. An incorrect description would mislead the listeners.
Attributive/Donnellan: the same possibility of incorrect description does not exist here: "Whoever it is" cannot be described incorrectly, the speaker believes a disjunction: "him or him or him..." - attributively used descriptions may fail and yet express something true. E.g. "The House of Deputies (correctly House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties" - No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means, you can correct him.
>Meaning (Intending).
I 195
Intent/Intention/Meaning/Donnellan: it's not about what someone wanted to say - otherwise you could take any description - nevertheless, the intention decides about referential or attributive use. I 199
Champagne Example/Donnellan: attributively no problem.
I ~ 202
Referential/Donnellan: could also be called a weak reference: whatever - real reference: attributive.
>Champagne example.
I 202
Problem of the Statement/Donnellan: E.g. (Linsky): her husband is kind to her (in the café, but he is not her husband) - referentially true - attributive: if phi, then psi, but there is no phi, then it's not correct to say: he says of him... (de re) - but referential: he said correctly of the so described that he ... ((s) also de re!) - Kripke: precisely not like distinction de re/de dicto - E.g. If the described person is also the president of the college, it is true of the president that he is kind - referential: here the speaker does not even have to agree.
Wolf I 18
Name/Description/Donnellan: a) referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description is not true: E.g. The man in court is not the murderer, but he is correctly determined as the one who behaves wildly. b) attributive use: "whoever it was" applies if we have no specific person in mind. ((s)> role functional role: what ever it is.)
>Roles, >Functional role.

Chisholm II 109
Donnellan/referential/attributive/Brandl: can the distinction not be explained by the fact that in one instance reference is made by signs and in another instance by speakers? No, then the referential use would only have drawn attention to a problem of pragmatics. Then Russell could have simply expanded his theory pragmatically.
Brandl: one can make the distinction referential/attributive even more pronounced if one applies it to precisely those signs with which the speaker makes it clear from the outset that he/she is not referring to a whole range of objects.
Newen I 94
Referential/Predicative/Singular Terms/Identification/Name/Strawson: Thesis:
Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referentially - descriptions: have at most predicative, i.e. descriptive, meaning (but can also refer simultaneously)
Ad Newen I 94
Referential/(s): selecting an object - attributive/(s): attributing properties.
Newen I 95
Attributive/Donnellan/(s): in the absence of the subject matter in question - referential/(s): in the presence of the subject matter in question
Newen I 95
DonnellanVsRussell: he has overlooked the referential use. He only considers the attributive use, because...
Descriptions/Russell: ...are syncategorematic expressions for him, which themselves cannot refer.
>Syncategorematic.
Newen I 96
Referential/description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has absolutely nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions. Referential use is possible and communication can succeed with it, but it belongs to pragmatics. Pragmatics: examines what is meant (contextual). It does not examine the context-independent semantics. Solution/Kripke: to make a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference.
>Speaker reference, >Reference.
Semantic meaning: is given by Russell's truth conditions: the murderer of Schmidt is insane iff the murderer of Schmidt is insane.
>Truth conditions.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Donnellan I
Keith S. Donnellan
"Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008


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