Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Content: content is that part of a statement, which can be expressed by another statement, which differs in a respect from the original statement, e.g. it uses other expressions with the same reference. That, in which the second statement deviates belongs then to the vocabulary, to the syntax or grammar, the matching can be called content. See also Semantic content, Conceptual content, Mental content.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Fred Dretske on Content - Dictionary of Arguments

I 218
Content/Thinking/Animal/Dretske: What a living thing "thinks" (the content) can be causally quite irrelevant. - E.g. bimetallic strip, it is the degree of curvature [that has a consequence], not what the curvature states.
>Causal theory of knowledge, >Thinking
, >Animals, >Animal language, >Language and thought, >Propositional content.


I Fred Dretske Minimale Rationalität in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg.)Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Dretske I
Fred Dretske
"Minimal Rationality", in: S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds (Eds.) Rational Animals?, Oxford 2005
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dretske II
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16
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