## Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||

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Consistency, philosophy, logic: The expression of consistency is applied to systems or sets of statements. From a contradictory system any statement can be derived (see ex falso quodlibet). Therefore, contradictory systems are basically useless. It is characteristic of a consistent system that not every statement can be proved within it. See also systems, provability, proofs, calculus, consistency, theories, completeness, validity, expressiveness.
Within a system, consistency may be demonstrated, but not beyond the boundaries of this system, since the use of the symbols and the set of possible objects are only defined for this system.
Within mathematics, and only there applies that the mathematical objects, which are mentioned in consistent formulas, exist (Hilbert, Über das Unendliche, 1926). See also falsification, verification, existence, well-formed._____________ Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||

Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Leon Henkin on Consistency - Dictionary of Arguments Quine IX 224 Henkin: shows the consistency of a ω-contradictory (omega-contradictory) system. (Also Goedel and Tarski). Just interpret "F" as true for all but those objects x that fulfill (7). (7) x ε N, x ≠ 0, x ≠ 1, x ≠ 2... ad infinitum >Sets/Henkin. A theory that is ω-contradictory seems unacceptable even if it is consistent. But according to Henkin, it is easy to see that the term and its definition are misleading. If a system is consistent and yet allows "Ex(x e N u ~Fx)" and "F0", "F1"...all as theorems, and if we guarantee the interpretation of "0" , "1" etc. as names of numbers, then the problem seems to be to interpret "N" as "number" and not more comprehensive. Henkin: shows that "N" can be interpreted as N containing extras even under the most favorable circumstances. (See Sets/Henkin) If the system is ω-contradictory, N must even be interpreted that way. ((s) "Extras": e.g. "...and their successors"). Sometimes it is then possible to limit "N" so that it avoids the extras, and sometimes this is not possible. For example, for every formifiable condition that is verifiably met by 0,1,2... ad infinitum, there is another condition that we can prove is also met by 0,1,2... and yet not by all things that meet the first condition. This is the chronic form of ω-contradictoriness that cannot be cured by an improved version of "N". (Quine: "numerically insegregative"). >Löwenheim. Def Omega-contradictory/(w)/Goedel: (Goedel 1931) is a system when there is a formula "Fx" such that any one of the statements "F0", "F1", "F2",... can be proved ad infinitum in the system, but also "Ex(x ε N and ~Fx)". >Contradictions, >Proofs, >Provability. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Henkin I Leon Henkin Retracing elementary mathematics New York 1962 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |

> Counter arguments against **Henkin**

> Counter arguments in relation to **Consistency**