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Semantics of possible worlds: is an expression for a theory that defines sentence meaning as the set of worlds in which this sentence is true. See also possible worlds, rigidity, semantics, propositions, meaning, modal logic, counterpart-theory, modal realism, necessity, possibility.
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Jaakko Hintikka on Possible World Semantics - Dictionary of Arguments

II 43
Semantics of Possible Worlds/possible world semantics/non-existent objects/non-existence/possibility/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds should assume possible individuals as inhabitants not only of possible worlds, but even of the actual world.
II 50
Semantics of Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: here there is no >systematic ambiguity
, i.e. the expressions mean intensionally the same as extensionally.
>Intensions, >Extensions.
E.g. to know what John knows is to know the worlds that are compatible with his belief, and to know which ones are not.
II 51
Extra premise: for this, one must be sure that an expression in different worlds picks out the same individual.
Context: what the relevant worlds are, depends on the context.
E.g. Ramses: here the case is clear.
On the other hand:
E.g. Herzl knew that Loris was a great poet.
Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal.
II 53
Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the difference of my approach to that of Frege is that I consider the problems locally, while Frege regards them globally.
Fregean sense (= way of being given)/Hintikka: the Fregean sense must be regarded as defined for all possible worlds. >Fregean sense, >Way of givenness.
On the other hand:
Hintikka: if the Fregean sense is constructed as a meaning function, it must be regarded in my approach only as defined for the relevant alternatives.
Frege: Frege uses the concept of the identity of the senses implicitly. And as a function of meaning the identity is only given if the mathematical function applies for all relevant arguments.
Totality/Hintikka: this concept of the totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful.
Solution/Hintikka: precisely the semantics of possible worlds helps to dispense with the totality of all possible worlds ((s) and to only consider the relevant alternatives, defined by the context).
Fregean Sense/Hintikka: the Fregean sense was constructed as a quasi-object (object of setting, propositional object, thought object, object of belief), because they were assumed as entities in the actual world, however abstract they were.
II 54
Meaning Function/HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere.
Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses".
Object of Knowledge/object of thought/Frege/Hintikka: Frege has never considered the problem, unlike e.g. Quine.
>Objects of thought, >Objects of belief.
II 57
Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: in order to be a solution, the meaning function must be a constant function, that is, it must pick out the same individuals in all the worlds.
II 205
Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds needs no conception of possible worlds as complete cosmological worlds, but only "small worlds", rather like event progress or situations, I also speak of "scenarios". >Situations.
Possible World/Hintikka: the expression possible world is misleading, if one considers them as complete worlds.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

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> Counter arguments in relation to Possible World Semantics

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