|Terminologies: here, special features of the language use of the individual authors are explained._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Diaz-Bone I 52f
Metaphysics/James: James uses the term "metaphysics" among other things disparagingly for contemporary philosophers, who base their statements on non-experienceable principles.
Diaz-Bone I 52f
Monism/James: monism is a designation for neo-Hegelian: the existence of an omniscient mind is viewed as a prerequisite for knowledge and experience (JamesVs).
Diaz-Bone I 112
"Living hypotheses": living hypotheses are those that arouse the inclination to act according to them.
Horwich I 29
Sentimentalism/"Sentimentalist fallacy"/James: James is shedding a lot of tears about abstract justice, generosity, beauty, etc., but never recognizes them when he meets them in the street, because circumstances make them always appear vulgar.
Rationalistic fallacy/James: (corresponds to the sentimentalistic fallacy): the rationalistic fallacy is abstracted to the unrecognizable.
Solution/Pragmatism/James: it's only about how things are paying off. So it is also e.g. in the case of health.
Correspondingly for truth:
Horwich I 30
Truth "with a big T": (in the singular) E.g. that 2 + 2 = 4. is always acknowledged.
Concrete truths/James: concrete truths are not always relevant. But they must be recognized only if their recognition is an aid. (1)
1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994