Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Falsification: Falsification is an experimental or logical refutation of a general or a specific statement. Depending on the nature of the statement, there are differences in terms of whether a single counterexample is sufficient for a falsification, or a certain ratio of positive and negative cases is crucial. See also verification, verificationism, confirmation, Bayesianism, probability, hypotheses, theories._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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I. Lakatos on Falsification - Dictionary of Arguments
Hacking I 286 LakatosVsPopper: falsification (ism) ("Man proposes, nature disposes") cannot be right, because it presupposes the distinction theory/observation. Incorrect assumptions: 1. that there is a psychological barrier between speculative and observation records 2. that observation sentences could be proved by facts. >Theory, >Observation, >Observation sentence. --- Schurz I 15 Falsification/asymmetry/Popper: falsification applies in strict (universal sentences without exception): they cannot be verified by a finite set of observations, but they can be falsified by a single counter-example. >Universal sentences, >Verification. LakatosVsPopper: Theories are never rejected on the basis of a single counter-example, but they are adjusted. >Progress._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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> Counter arguments against Lakatos
> Counter arguments in relation to Falsification
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18