Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Seeing: In philosophy, the following questions related to seeing are interesting. The nature of perception, the relationship between perception and knowledge, the role of vision in human experience. See also Perception, Sensory impressions, Experience, Knowledge, Art, Artworks, Aesthetics, Aesthetic perception.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Imre Lakatos on Seeing - Dictionary of Arguments

Hacking I 286
Seeing/Lakatos/Hacking: He has only one example: Galileo's observation of solar spots through a telescope:
This could not have been pure seeing.
>Method
, cf. >Instrumentalism.
>Observation sentence, >Observation, >Observation language, >Verification, >Falsification.
Therefore:
Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be correct because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule, according to which the human thinks and directs nature, is not tenable. Two wrong assumptions:
1. There would be a psychological boundary between speculative and observation-related sentences.
2. The assumption that observation statements could be proved by facts.
HackingVsLakatos: these assumptions have now been mocked for 15 years, but Lakatos' argumentation is superficial.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Laka I
I. Lakatos
The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19
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