Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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G.W. Leibniz on Reason (Justification) - Dictionary of Arguments

Holz I 66
Proposition of sufficient reason/principle/Leibniz: "nothing happens without sufficient reason, without which it is possible for the person who is sufficiently acquainted with things to state a reason why it is so and not otherwise."
This is a derivative of the identity principle. Its validity is logically necessary.
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Holz I 67
Reason/Leibniz: that something has a reason is that it does not exist from itself, not isolated per se.
Reason is the foundation of the world, in which every individual is admitted (> chain/Leibniz).
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Holz I 75
Reason/Leibniz: can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is, however, not to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole!
Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as a depicting) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as a totality of the series) must be within the series.
Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (totality of the series of things, world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all!


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-06-21
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