Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Totality, philosophy: is the entirety of the components of a domain. An entity that can be described by specifying the characteristics, properties, rules, possible states, the possible actions, possible changes etc. Statements about totalities are impossible if it is required that the standpoint for these statements would have to be localized both inside and outside of this totality. Since it is impossible to define a totality without a circle and the help of concepts from this totality itself, it is problematic to speak of a totality of the world. See also paradoxes, wholes, set theory, universal class, universal set, mereological sum, systems, exterior/interior._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G.W. Leibniz on Totality - Dictionary of Arguments
Holz I 73 Totality/whole/outer/outside/Leibniz: because it is one and all (hen kei pan) as such, this supreme general must be conceived outside the series rerum. The world is not a link, but the series itself. ((s) Therefore not outside). >Interior/exterior/Leibniz, >Reality/Leibniz, >Order/Leibniz, >Terminology/Leibniz. Aristotle: thus the whole series is "being itself" (on hê on). Holz: the absolutely irreducible sentence, the first axiom at all: "The world is all that what is the case". The connection of all bodies, however, is not itself a body, that is, not extensional (res extensa, Descartes) but intensional, the structure. >Intension/Leibniz, >Extension. This is the "complete concept". >Hegel: "absolute concept". Complete concept/Leibniz: the complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, it is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. >Concept/Leibniz. It is only perceptible to an infinite mind. >Perception/Leibniz, >Knowledge/Leibniz. I 74 Identity/Leibniz/Holz: the identity of the finite with itself is formally not to be distinguished from the identity of the infinite whole with itself. Outer/outside/whole/Leibniz: If there was an infinite mind, it would have to be outside the whole to be able to grasp it at the same time. But with this the whole would not be the whole anymore. It is a priori true that the whole cannot be mapped isotropically. Hence, the boundary concept of the infinite mind remains a heuristic fiction, a heuristic analogy to the finite mind. I 113 Single/whole/identity/Leibniz/Holz: the identity of the individual with the whole and vice versa is based on the distinction between the two. (> Hegel: Reason: the >unity of identity and difference). Leibniz: the immanence of substance in the world and the inherence of the world in the individual substance. Logical form/Holz: the "overarching general":´ I 114 The whole has two types: A) the whole itself and B) the individual, which on the one hand is a kind of whole ((s) by demarcation), and yet its opposite, namely, a part. >Order/Leibniz. The ontological correspondence of this logical structure: Twofold way of being in: (A) "in the world" (B) Substance itself as something comprehensive, in which the totality of all other substances, that is, the world, is "contained" as a condition of its own. >Substance/Leibniz._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-25