Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Sufficiency: The reason for an action or the reason for a conclusion is sufficient if no further conditions are necessary. However, this does not mean that the consequences must also occur, since obstacles or physical hindrances have not yet been taken into account. See also ceteris paribus, necessity.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

G.W. Leibniz on Sufficiency - Dictionary of Arguments

Holz I 66
Sentence of the sufficient reason/principle/Leibniz: "nothing is done without sufficient reason, without which it is possible for the person who is sufficiently acquainted with things to state a reason why it is so and not otherwise."
This is a derivative of the identity principle. Its validity is logically necessary.
>Principles/Leibniz
, >Identity principle/Leibniz, >Necessity/Leibniz, >Reason/Leibniz, >Justification/Leibniz, >Ultimate justification/Leibniz.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Holz I
Hans Heinz Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992

Holz II
Hans Heinz Holz
Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-23
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